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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the well established doctrine28 which permits the taking of jurisdiction
in the first instance in order to determine jurisdiction. The refusal of
the Virginia Court to make a further finding of fact left the Supreme
Court in the position to dismiss the case for lack of a federal question
since, theoretically, it never had one before it. This would be only a
reaffirmance of the doctrine invoked in the Rescue Army case and not a
recognition of an evasion of its mandate. It should be noted that such
a disposition of the case would not prejudice the constitutional questions
involved from being raised again in a subsequent case.
TED G. WEST.
Bills and Notes-Holder in Due Course-Finance Companies
In an era characterized by a phenomenal upward surge of retail in-
stallment purchasing," the comparative serenity of appellate litigation in
the field of negotiable instruments has been consistently interrupted by
cases arising out of financial credit arrangements. Such arrangements
consist of informal agreements, usually of long standing, between dealers
and finance companies whereby the latter purchases commercial paper
arising out of a sale to the consumer. The finance company usually sup-
plies the blank forms for notes and conditional sales contracts as well as
supervises, to varying degrees, the terms of credit. The question is thus
presented: Do such credit arrangements cause the finance company to
become an active participator in the sale to the consumer so as to pre-
clude it from being a holder in due course of the transferred paper?
Notwithstanding the fact that the Negotiable Instruments Law sets
out precise standards2 for the determination of this question, several
jurisdictions have judicially effected other criteria which, upon applica-
tion to these credit arrangements, have denied the finance company the
protection afforded a holder in due course.3 In a recent case of first
2' "Whether the statutory requirements (for appellate review) have been met is
itself a federal question." Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 16 (1936).
' Installment credit reached an estimated total of $1,593,000,000 for the year
ending March 31, 1955. This figure represents credit extended only for the pur-
chase of consumer goods secured by the items purchased, title being held either by
the retail outlets or financial institutions. 39 CONsuMER FINANCE NEWS no. 12,
p. 31 (1955).
2 N. I. L. § 52: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument
under the following conditions: . . . (3) that he took it in good faith for value;(4) that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
N. I. L. § 56: "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated
must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
' Such results are reached on the basis that when the finance company and dealer
engage in preconceived credit arrangements, the company, which is better able to
bear the risk of loss than the hard pressed consumer, has become a party to the
original transaction and is subject to defenses available against the dealer. See
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impression,4 North Carolina was placed in accord with these jurisdictions.
In that decision, Roofing Co. negotiated to Mortgage Corp. Cus-
tomer's note secured by a deed of trust. Customer, alleging fraud by
Roofing Co., brought an action for cancellation of the note and deed of
trust. The issue of fraud having shifted the burden of proof to the
holder,5 Mortgage Corp. introduced evidence showing that it had fur-
nished the forms for the note and deed of trust, on the back of which
appeared its name; that it had purchased similar notes over a course
of dealing with Roofiing Co. without previous defenses being asserted;
that the note was payable at its offices and the deed of trust named
one of its officials as trustee; that it had no actual notice of any de-
fenses Customer might have, but took the instruments in reliance on
their ostensible regularity. The court held that such evidence was
sufficient to support a jury finding that Mortgage Corp. could not be
a holder in due course and was thus subject to defenses of Customer.
In so holding, the court completely shunned the test of actual notice or
bad faith and relied instead on the active role played by Mortgage Corp.
in the transaction between Roofing Co. and Customer.6
A survey of recent case law and existing statutes reveals that the area
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S. W. 2d 260 (1940) (finance
company supplied forms on which there was printed an assignment to the company;
transfer made immediately following the sale) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950) (finance company
supplied forms; twice consulted as to the dealer-purchaser transaction) ; Mutual
Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953) (finance company supplied forms;
its name in bold print on the instruments; company's office designated as place of
payment); General Motors Acceptance CQrp. v. Daigle, 72 So. 2d 319 (La. 1954)
(finance company furnished forms, financed sale; instruments made payable at
company's office). The Daigle case is discussed in Note, 53 MIcHa L. REV. 877
(1955).
In addition to the cases based on close participation, several courts have adopted
an agency theory, whereby the finance company, as a consequence of the credit
arrangement, is deemed to be the principal of the retailer and thus knowledge of
the dealer is imputed to the company. Palmer v. Associate Discount Corp., 124
F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir. 1941) ; Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742,
296 N. Y. Supp. 783 (City Ct. Buffalo 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N. Y. S.
2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937). For a discussion of these cases, see Note, 33 N. C. L.
Rav. 608 (1955).
' Whitfield v. Carolina Housing & Mortgage Corp., 243 N. C. 658, 92 S. E. 2d
78 (1956).
IN. I. L. § 59: "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some
person under whom be claims acquired the title as a holder in due course."
'Note, 33 N. C. L. RFv. 608, 613 (1955), where the writer points out that
"(N) othing but uncertainty can arise out of an encroachment upon these statutory
provisions [the Negotiable Instruments Law] by judicial decision." He further
comments that to undermine the position of the finance company's status as a holder
in due course, when no actual knowledge or bad faith has been shown, would
seriously curtail the outlet for the sale of commercial paper arising out of install-
ment purchasing and "limit the accessibility of this market to the public." See
also in this connection Note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 775, 776 (1955).
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upon which the North Carolina Supreme Court has so freshly trod is in
utter conflict.
In Public Loan Corp. of Little Rock v. Terrell,7 an Arkansas case,
buyer purchased an appliance from retailer, executing a note secured by
a conditional sales contract. On the same day, retailer assigned the note
and contract to finance company, which had prepared blank notes and
contract forms used in the transaction. There was no evidence of actual
notice or bad faith. In an action to collect on the note, buyer raised the
defense of failure of consideration, the appliance being wholly defective.
The court held that the defense was not tenable, since plaintiff was a
holder in due course. It stated that evidence of preparing forms and
taking an assignment immediately after the sale fell short of establishing
actual participation; that there being no evidence of actual notice or
bad faith, finance company was not precluded from being a bona fide
purchaser.
It should be noticed that only some years before, this same Arkansas
court held in Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs8 that the finance company
was not a holder in due course because it had prepared forms on which
there was- a written assignment to the company and the transfer of the
note and contract was on the same day as the sale.0 The Terrell case
neither cites nor mentions the Childs case.
In Clark v. Associated Discount Corp.,'0 the Georgia court stated
that merely because a note is made on a form furnished by the finance
company and made payable at its offices, and the company makes in-
quiries as to the purchaser's credit standing does not, without more,
subject the transferee to notice of any infirmity of the instrument or
defect in the title."
This decision should be compared with Mutual Finance Co. v. Mar-
tin,12 where the Florida court held that plaintiff finance company could
not be a holder in due course on ostensibly the same set of facts.
7 224 Ark. 616, 275 S. W. 2d 435 (1955).
8 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S. W. 2d 260 (1940).
' Also contrast with the Terrell case Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,
220 Ark. 56, 247 S. W. 2d 1 (1952), where the court held that the participation
of the finance company in the credit arrangement was such as to prevent it from
becoming a holder in due course.
1092 Ga. App. 583, 89 S. E. 2d 208 (1955).
11 See also Aid Investment & Discount, Inc. v. Younkin, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 514,
188 N. E. 2d 183 (1951), where the evidence disclosed that upon the face of the
instrument, in bold type, appeared "Payable at the Office of Aid Investment & Dis-
count, Inc." and on the reverse side appeared the plaintiff's name. The court held
that this fact would not alone support the conclusion that plaintiff is not a holder
in due course. "It is a custom of long standing for banking institutions to provide
notes for their customers on the face of which is printed in large type 'payable at
designated bank.' To hold that this in and of itself is proof that the bank is jointly
interested with the payee of a note would not be a reasonable deduction; nor would
the fact alone that an endorsee of a note makes inquiry as to the transaction wherein
the note was given and the financial ability of the maker to pay establish any joint
relationship...." Id., at 518, 188 N. E. 2d at 187.
'*63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
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Moreover, only one year after the Martin case was decided, a federal
court sitting in the same state held that evidence showing that the finance
company furnished forms to the dealer and that such forms contained
an advertisement of the company was not sufficient to constitute that
degree of participation necessary to render the finance company subject
to defenses.' 3
There is, however, support in recent cases for the North Carolina
position. In United States v. Klatt,14 defendant's note was assigned to
a bank before maturity, which it in turn assigned to the plaintiff after
maturity. Plaintiff contended that it was immune from defenses since
it derived its title from a holder in due course.', There was evidence
that the bank supplied the forms used in the dealer-purchaser transaction
together with a borrower's completion certificate required by legisla-
tion.'8 Although the court could have held the bank not a holder in due
course because it was charged with notice that the purchaser's name had
been forged on the certificate, it found that:
"... the relationship between the payee named in the instrument
in suit and the bank, as to the entire transaction giving rise to the
instrument was such that the bank must be considered in effect
a party to the transaction between named payee-dealer and the
defendant."' 7
The use of the close participation criteria on such meager evidence
undoubtedly invites criticism. But what is even more startling than the
result reached is the fact that here, a bank, rather than a finance com-
pany, was held not to be a bona fide purchaser because of an "active"
role played in the credit arrangement.1 8 Certainly banks do not engage
in the financing of consumer goods to that degree practiced by financing
companies. But even in those cases where banks do so engage, the
transaction is probably an isolated one, not a part of a preconceived
credit arrangement which anticipates the continual flow of commercial
paper. Seemingly it would follow that courts would scrutinize commer-
" Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N. D. Fla.
195 i35 F. Supp. 648 (S. D. Cal. 1955).15 N. I. L. § 58: "But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due
course and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment, has all the rights of such former holder in respect to all parties prior to the
latter."
", The loan being applied for under the National Housing Act, the borrower
was required by statute to fill out a borrower's completion certificate evidencing
the tite of the chattel securing the loan.
' United States v. Klatt, 135 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S. D. Cal. 1955).
x8 See also Public National Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernadez, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 721
(Mun. Ct. N. Y. C. 1952), where the court, in denying plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment, echoed the holding of the De Marsio case, cited note 3 supra, and
stated that the dealer could be found to be a mere agent of the plaintiff bank.
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cial transactions between banks and dealers less acutely and be guided,
not by judicially created standards, but rather by the presence of actual
notice or bad faith.1 9
In addition to the formula established by some courts in settling such
controversies, several states have adopted legislation which virtually
precludes the finance company or bank from becoming a holder in due
course.20  In essence, the fiat of these provisions is that all notes given
in credit transactions and secured by a conditional sale (or chattel mort-
gage) shall state upon their face that they are so secured, and that no
transferee of such notes shall be immune from the defenses available by
the maker against the payee.2 ' Since the vast majority of the cases under
consideration involve credit financing by means of promissory notes se-
cured by the retention of title of the item purchased, these statutes
obviously undermine the security of the finance company's position.
The law thus remains unsettled. However, the position taken by the
courts in the Terrell and Clark decisions in utilizing the standards as
incorporated in the Negotiable Instruments Law is encouraging. Cer-
tainly the innocent consumer should not be subjected to the unscrupulous
activities which might arise from a dealer-finance company partnership.
But in such cases of close participation, recourse may be had to the
elastic provisions of section 56 and if such participation renders the
finance company incapable of taking the commercial paper in good faith,
it will be denied the holder in due course status.
The protection of the consumer must be balanced against encourage-
ment of credit sales essential to the maintenance of national prosperity.
It is a policy conflict that cannot be arbitrarily settled; rather, there must
be flexibility. It is submitted that neither the judicially created criteria
of close participation, which categorically denounces the credit arrange-
ment whether there is bad faith or not, nor the above mentioned statutes,
which arbitrarily exclude an important segment of the economy from
protection, affords this flexibility; that the result expressed in the Terrell
" Compare with this observation the excerpt from an address by Owen L. Coon,
banker and finance company executive, concerning finance companies as opposed to
banks as appropriate financing agencies for installment selling: "You must under-
stand that the dealer is, to a great extent, a partner of the finance company. The
relationship in paper form may be that of debtor and creditor. Regardless of that
however, the finance company is, in many ways, the partner of the dealer and must
always so remain. Bankers, on the other hand, must always shun relationships that
in theory as well as in practice have possibilities of turning out to be partnerships."
23 AmERiCAN J. oF Ixs. No. 2, 18, 20 (1946).
20 ILL. Rxv. STAT. c. 95, § 26 (1953) ; MD. Conz ANN. art. 83, § 134 (FLAcK
1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 69, § 615G (PuRDoN, Supp. 1954).
" It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes do not set
out the consequences of not complying with the provisions. Only the Illinois
statute states thaf if these provisions are not met, the chattel mortgage securing the
notes "shall be absolutely void."
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and Clark decisions should be seriously considered in the determination
of future conflicts arising in this area.
WILLIAM E. ZUCKERMAN.
Conflict of Laws-Workmen's Compensation-Application of Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes and Awards
Shortly after the introduction of the first workmen's compensation
statutes,1 the courts faced the problem of their application where an
employee had been hired in one state and was injured in a sister state.
Prior to 1932 each state decided whether the situation permitted the
application of her own act.2  The claimant, suing in the locus deicti,
usually succeeded ini i'nvong the application of its statute.3  In some
instances, however, certain restrictive statutory provisions prevented the
state of the injury from applying her act4 and the employee had to resort
to suit in the state where his contract had been made.5 In these cases
suit had to be brought in the state of the contract in order to obtain the
benefit of that state's act, as the state of the injury considered the cause
of action created by the foreign act to be so interwoven with the remedy
that it felt compelled not to enforce it.6 Occasionally, the requirements
'Wisconsin's workmen's compensation act was the first to take effect (1911).
SoMERs, WORtmEN'S COMPENSATION 32 (1954). The New York statute was the
first to be declared constitutional by the United States Supreme Court. N. Y. Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
* LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 8620 (1954).
* Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac.
644 (1927); Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., 182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E. 833
(1921) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889 (1931).
However, where the statute of the place of the injury is of the contractual type, the
courts have refused to apply their acts to injuries within the state, if the hiring
had been elsewhere. Hall v. Ind. Comm'n, 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 1073 (1925);
Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675 (1925).
Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F. 2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied
323 U. S. 735 (1944) seems to be the first case in which a court permitted recovery
for an injury in the forum (Massachusetts) though all other incidents of employ-
ment were elsewhere (New York). But it is now well established that the state
in which the injury occurred may give an award. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408
(1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493
(1939).
12 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 87.14 (1952).
r Grinnel v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. 103 (1916) ; Gooding v. Ott, 77
W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862 (1916).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the state of the contract may
give an award. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532
(1935). Twelve states confer coverage regardless of where the injury occurred if
the contract was made in the state; Nevada requires also that the employee is in
regular employment in the state; California and Michigan require that the employee
also be in residence there. Other states permit recovery only if more than two
factors coincide; e.g., N. C.. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1950) : "If the contract of employ-
ment was made in this State, if the employer's place of business is in this State,
and if the residence of the employee is in this State; provided his contract of em-
ployment was not expressly for service exclusively outside of the State."
'In Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S. W. 762 (1925),
the claimant could not proceed in the Missouri court under the Kansas Work-
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